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I. INTRODUCTION
One cannot discuss the subject of judicial review to correct arbitral
error without first looking at the assumptions underlying the purpose of
such review. Unless the arbitrators are under a duty to at least try to decide
disputes correctly on the basis of applicable law and explain the rationale of
their award, there would be no purpose for judicial review beyond the
narrow statutory grounds set forth in Section 10(a) of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).I
Commercial arbitration in the United States had its inception in certain
industries (e.g., textiles and construction) where the parties wanted industry
people rather than lawyers to decide their disputes, primarily on the basis
of customary practices in their industry rather than legal principles. The
parties preferred this business rather than legal approach because the
disputes usually involved factual rather than legal issues (e.g., whether the
goods were defective or whether the work conformed to the plans and
specifications). That is undoubtedly the reason that the Commercial
* The author is counsel to the law firm of Friedman, Wittenstein & Hochman in
New York City. Mr. Hochman is a frequent writer and lecturer in the ADR field, Chair
of the ALI-ABA annual course of study on ADR and a member of the American Law
Institute and various ADR-related bar associations and advisory committees. He is the
immediate past Chair of the Arbitration Committee of the American Bar Association's
Section of Dispute Resolution and a former Co-Chair of its Subcommittee on
Large/Complex Case Arbitrations. He is also an arbitrator and mediator on various
ADR panels, including the arbitration and mediation panels of the NASD and the
mediation panels of various federal and state courts, including the U.S. District Courts
for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.
I The four statutory grounds for vacating an arbitral award enumerated in Section
10(a) of the FAA, which are substantially the same as the grounds set forth in Section
12(a) of the Uniform Arbitration Act, are (1) the procurement of the award by
corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,
or either of them; (3) refusal to hear pertinent and material evidence or to postpone the
hearing upon sufficient cause or other prejudicial misconduct of the arbitrators and (4)
where the arbitrators have exceeded their powers. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. § 10(a) (1994); UNiF. ARBrRATION Acr § 12(a), 7 U.L.A. 280 (1997).
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Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA) did not
require arbitrators to even attempt to follow applicable law in rendering
their awards. In fact, Rule 43 of the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules
expressly provides that arbitrators can grant "any remedy or relief that the
arbitrator deems just and equitable." 2
As arbitration became an acceptable method of dispute resolution in the
broader commercial arena and as disputes began to involve more complex
legal issues, many parties to commercial agreements were unwilling to
agree to arbitration pursuant to the AAA's standard pre-dispute arbitration
clause and its Commercial Arbitration Rules. Their lawyers advised them
that it was too risky to agree to arbitrate under rules which permitted the
arbitrators to decide their disputes on the basis of the arbitrators' subjective
notions of fairness, justice and equity rather than on the basis of the
predictable rules of law under which most businesses operate. Thus, many
business people avoid what is sometimes referred to as "roll-the-dice" or
"Russian roulette" arbitration. 3
The efficiency, speed and finality of arbitration offer distinct
advantages over traditional litigation. However, because of the
uncertainties inherent in AAA arbitration and the lack of an effective means
of judicial review to correct arbitral error, there are many who avoid using
AAA pre-dispute arbitration clauses in their agreements because they have
no confidence that the arbitrators' decision will be as objective, predictable
and correct as one would expect if the decision were made by a highly
respected judge sitting without a jury.
Another reason business people are dissatisfied with traditional
arbitration pursuant to the. AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules is the
AAA's policy of discouraging their arbitrators from explaining the reasons
for their awards. Although the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules neither
require nor prohibit reasoned awards, the AAA's Guide for Commercial
Arbitrators clearly discourages them, stating that "written opinions might
open avenues for attack on the award by the losing party." 4 In fact, at least
2 COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION
RULE 43 (1996).
3 See Abraham Fuchsberg, The Arbitrariness of Arbitrators, N.Y. L.J., July 21,
1992, at 2.
4 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASsOCIATION, A GUIDE FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS
24 (1991); see also ROBERT COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO
KNOw 30 (5th ed. 1993) ("Written opinions can be dangerous because they identify
targets for the losing party to attack.").
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in the New York region, the AAA has stricken from its panel of
commercial arbitrators certain lawyer-arbitrators who, as a matter of
conscience, insist on explaining their arbitral awards, even where the
explanation may consist of no more than a short statement of the
arbitrator's findings relating to the critical issues in the dispute.
Undoubtedly, there are many well-qualified AAA arbitrators who would
like to explain their arbitration awards so that the losing party will at least
understand that the award was rendered impartially and is supported by
logical reasoning. However, several of these arbitrators have stated to this
author privately that they are afraid to do so for fear that they will also be
"excommunicated" by the AAA.
Many parties believe that the process of explaining the reasons and
legal basis for an arbitral award serves as a useful discipline for those
arbitrators who place a premium on making legally correct and rational
decisions. 5 Such an explanation also reduces the risk that the arbitrators will
play Solomon by "splitting the baby" or decide the dispute on a subjective
basis. The more understandable the award, the more likely it is to be
respected, even by the losing party. Without such an explanation, the
arbitration process may appear to be an arbitrary process, where the
arbitrators are free to decide disputes on the basis of their own prejudices.
It has been said that legal uncertainty breeds litigation. Because of the
uncertainty inherent in AAA arbitration conducted pursuant to the AAA's
standard pre-dispute arbitration clause and its Commercial Arbitration
Rules, most sophisticated parties to commercial agreements will continue to
avoid arbitration as a means for resolving their disputes pursuant to these
rules.6 Despite the costs and delays inherent in litigation, many parties will
continue to prefer litigation as the lesser evil, because trial courts are
required to at least attempt to decide disputes correctly on the basis of
applicable law, and if the trial courts get it wrong, there is an appellate
court that can fix the error.
Once the bridge of a reasoned award is crossed, the issue of the pros
and cons of substantive appellate review can be addressed. Obviously, there
cannot be meaningful appellate review of an unexplained arbitral award.
5 For an excellent discussion of the pros and cons of requiring written opinions to
explain arbitral awards, see Lynn Katzler, Should Mandatory Written Opinions Be
Required in All Securities Arbitrations?: The Practical and Legal Implications to the
Securities Industry, 45 AM. U. L. Rlv. 152 (1995).
6 See Stephen A. Hochman, A Bar Association-Sponsored Forum for Arbitration Is
Needed, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 22, 1992, at 1.
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II. REASONED AWARDS WITHOUT SUBSTANTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW
One of the reasons many parties choose arbitration over litigation is the
finality of the arbitral award. 7 Even though a trial court may be more likely
to deliver a legally correct result, and an appellate procedure exists to
correct its mistakes, some parties have concluded that the higher quality of
the judicial system comes at too high a price in terms of delay and expense.
However, some have attempted to get the best of both worlds-a correct
result without sacrificing the benefit of the finality of arbitration-by
providing in their pre-dispute arbitration clause that the arbitrators must be
highly qualified lawyer-arbitrators who are committed to deciding all
disputes on the basis of applicable law and setting forth the reasons for their
award.
Paragraph one of Appendix A to this Article contains a relatively
abbreviated example of such a "best-of-both-worlds" alternative to the
AAA's standard pre-dispute arbitration clause for those who would like
legally correct arbitral awards but are not willing to subject the award to
substantive judicial review. 8 This alternative provision requires the
arbitrators to be experienced lawyers, permits each party to strike any or
all of the AAA's nominees for arbitrators on a peremptory basis, requires
the arbitrators to endeavor to follow applicable law and judicial precedent
and requires that arbitrators set forth the findings and conclusions upon
which their award is based. In order to counter the argument that inserting
a provision requiring arbitrators to follow the law and explain their awards
will enlarge the scope of judicial review, this alternative clause expressly
provides that the award is final and binding on all parties and shall not be
vacated or modified by any court (for errors of law or otherwise) except
upon the limited grounds provided by statute. The purpose of this last
provision is to discourage the losing party from attempting to overturn the
arbitral award on any ground other than the statutory ones.9
7 For an excellent discussion of the pros and cons of permitting judicial review of
arbitral awards, see Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND.
L.J. 425 (1988).
8 For other (and more extensive) examples of pre-dispute arbitration clauses,
including alternative methods of arbitrator selection, see Stephen A. Hochman, Model
Dispute Resolution Provisions for Use in Commercial Agreements Between Parties with
Equal Bargaining Power, in 1 ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (ADR): How To
UsE IT TO Your ADVANTAGE 189 (1994).
9 Of course, there can be no assurance that a court will not vacate an arbitral award
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A contractual provision requiring the arbitrators to endeavor to follow
applicable law and explain their awards without expanding the statutory
grounds for judicial review may satisfy those who put a higher premium on
the finality of the arbitration award than they do on the risk that the
arbitrator will commit legal error. However, even if the parties could be
confident that every arbitrator would be at least as competent as the
average trial judge to correctly decide the dispute, some parties will not
buy into arbitration without the safety net of some degree of substantive
judicial review. Before addressing the various levels of substantive judicial
review, it may be useful to look at the cases that have addressed the issue
of whether courts will expand the statutory grounds for judicial review of
arbitral awards merely because the parties have agreed that they should
make this expansion. 10
on the ground that it violates a "strong public policy" or is "completely irrational"
despite a contractual provision limiting the scope of review to the statutory grounds,
possibly by finding that the award exceeds the powers of the arbitrators, which is the
fourth statutory ground set forth in Section 10(a) of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). For
example, in Lindenstadt v. Staff Builders, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 484, 491 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1997), the court held that the trial court should review de novo the issue of
whether the arbitrator's award was based on an illegal contract (in this case a contract to
pay a commission to an unlicensed person for services as a real estate broker) since an
award based on an illegal contract would violate public policy and thus exceed the
arbitrator's powers. However, in Des Tombe v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 8 Sec. Arb.
Commentator 21-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), the court, in rejecting the "completely
irrational" standard for vacating an erroneous arbitral award, held that as long as the
arbitrators have the power and authority to decide a particular issue, their decision
cannot exceed their powers within the meaning of the statute. See id.
10 It is interesting to note that a study committee of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), which was appointed to consider
revisions to the Uniform Arbitration Act, recommended that its drafting committee
consider adding a statutory provision to make it clear that parties can, by their
agreement, permit appeals to the courts to correct arbitral errors of law. However, the
NCCUSL Study Committee, recognizing the importance of finality in arbitration,
specifically declined to recommend changing Section 12 of the Uniform Arbitration Act
to provide for "statute mandated judicial review of awards concerning errors of fact
and/or law." NCCUSL Study Committee Report, Recommendation No. 2 (1995).
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HII. ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS FOR EXPANDED JUDICIAL
REVIEW
In Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens v. Midland Metals Corp.," the
parties provided in their arbitration clause that the court "shall have the
power to review (1) whether the findings of fact rendered by the arbitrator
are, on the entire record of said arbitration proceedings, supported by
substantial evidence, and (2) whether as a matter of law based on such
findings of fact the award should be affirmed, modified or vacated." 12 The
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, after reviewing
the award in accordance with the agreement of the parties, modified the
award to correct an arbitral error. 13 The court held that because it had
subject matter jurisdiction to act as a trial court and determine all issues if
the parties had not agreed to arbitration, there was no public policy reason
not to make the more limited judicial determination which the parties
provided for in their arbitration clause. 14 The court noted that the parties
may not have agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration without such a
broad provision for judicial review. 15
Similarly, in Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp.,16 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld an arbitration clause
which provided that the arbitration award "shall be final and binding on
both parties, except that errors of law shall be subject to appeal."17 The
court cited Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. 18 for the
proposition that, where the parties contractually agree to permit expanded
review of the arbitration award, the FAA requires that the court enforce the
arbitration agreement in accordance with its terms. 19 Although the district
court reviewed the arbitral award, it did so under the "harmless error"
standard and accordingly confirmed the award. 20 The Fifth Circuit reversed
the district court and reviewed the arbitral award de novo for errors of law
11 584 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
12Id. at 242.
13 See id. at 245-246.
14 See id. at 244.
15 See id.
16 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
17 Id. at 996 (emphasis in original).
18 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
19 See Gateway Technologies, 64 F.3d at 996 (5th Cir. 1995).
20 See id. at 997.
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because the parties undoubtedly intended the court to follow the same
standard as would be applied by an appellate court reviewing the actions of
a lower court.21
In LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.22 the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California, on facts substantially the
same as those in Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens, refused to review the
entire record of the arbitration proceeding to determine whether the
findings of the arbitrators were supported by substantial evidence. The
court stated that, although a court may have subject matter jurisdiction over
the claim submitted to arbitration, "its power to adjudicate . . . cannot be
changed or altered by the agreement of the parties ... "23 The court
declined to follow Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens and distinguished
Gateway Technologies, where the agreement merely provided for judicial
review to correct errors of law, by emphasizing that the agreement in
LaPine Technology required the court to review the award not only to
correct errors of law, but to determine whether the arbitrators' findings of
fact were supported by substantial evidence. 24
The holding in LaPine Technology seems an aberration, and most
commentators (including this author) believe that it will be reversed by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where it is presently on appeal. Because
arbitration is a creature of contract and the policy of the FAA is to favor
arbitration, Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens seems more consistent with such
policy than LaPine Technology.25
Assuming the courts will honor a pre-dispute arbitration agreement
which expands the statutory grounds for judicial review, the question is
whether it is a good idea for the parties to opt for judicial review, and if so,
by what standard.
21 See id.
22 909 F. Supp. 697, 706 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
23 Id. at 703.
24 See id. at 702, 704-705. For an analysis of Fils et Cables D'Acier de Lens,
Gateway Technologies and LaPine Technology, see Robert A. Holtzman, Arbitrary
Decisions-Are Arbitral Decisions that Ignore the Law Subject to Judicial Review?,
L.A. LAw., Oct. 1996, at 50.
25 However, see Richard Chemick, Clause Celebre: Enhancing, Not Inhibiting,
Enforcement, L.A. DAILY J., June 26, 1996, at 7 (pointing out the disadvantages of
providing for judicial review of factual as well as legal arbitral findings).
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IV. THE VARIOUS LEVELs OF EXPANDED JUDICIAL REVIEW
One of the problems with the present state of arbitration law is the
confusing array of nonstatutory grounds for judicial review of arbitral
awards. Despite the fact that Section 10(a) of the FAA specifies only four
narrow grounds for vacating arbitration awards,2 6 none of which permit
judicial review of the substance or merits of the award, most state, as well
as federal, courts have been willing to scrutinize the merits of an arbitral
award to determine whether it is (1) in "manifest disregard" of the law, (2)
in conflict with a strong "public policy," (3) "arbitrary and capricious" or
"completely irrational" or (4) fails to "draw its essence" from the parties'
underlying contract. 27 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals is the only
circuit to have clearly rejected the nonstatutory grounds for vacatur, stating
that "Congress has limited the grounds upon which an arbitral award can
be vacated . . .[to the four grounds set forth in Section 10(a) of the FAA,
which] do not permit rejection of an arbitral award based on disagreement
with the particular result the arbitrators reached." 28 Despite the fact that
many other circuit courts of appeals pay lip service to the statutory grounds
being the only grounds for vacatur, they nevertheless explain why the
arbitral error in the case before it is a "garden variety" error of law rather
than the more flagrant or egregious error which is arguably subject to
vacatur.
The result of these vague and confusing judicially created standards for
review is that the losers in arbitration often attempt to overturn the award
on one of these imprecise grounds; such attempts are almost always futile.
Thus, rather than getting arbitration instead of litigation, the parties end up
with arbitration and litigation.
The notion of providing for judicial review to correct errors of law has
gained support from judges as well as legislators. Judge Joyce Kennard of
the California Supreme Court, who wrote the dissenting opinion in
Moncharsh v. Haily & Blaise,29 has been one of the more articulate
26 See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).
27 For an excellent scholarly and comprehensive analysis of these nonstatutory
grounds for arbitral review, see Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial
Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv. 731, 739
(1996).
28 Remmey v. Paine Webber Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994).
29 832 P.2d 899, 919 (Cal. 1992) (en banc) (Kennard, J., dissenting). The majority
opinion in Moncharsh held that an arbitrator's decision is not reviewable even for errors
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proponents of permitting judicial review of arbitral awards under certain
limited circumstances. In her speech to the Uniform Arbitration Act
Symposium of the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association
held in Washington, D.C., on April 19, 1997, Judge Kennard pointed out
that "the question of judicial review of arbitration awards does not present
an all-or-nothing choice between, on the one hand, no judicial review and,
on the other hand, a right to full-scale, de novo judicial review at both the
trial and appellate court levels." 30
Judge Kennard suggested an intermediate position that, even in the
absence of an agreement by the parties to allow substantive judicial review,
awards which are "manifestly erroneous" and cause a "substantial
injustice" should be subject to vacation by a court.31 In support of her
position, Judge Kennard quoted from a 1982 decision of the Michigan
Supreme Court, stating:
The Michigan judiciary is not a procedural pass-through bureaucracy
which may, by agreement of private disputants, be used to validate
patently erroneous arbitration awards as a trade-off for docket relief and
speedy, inexpensive, and unreviewable dispute resolution. We cannot give
parties the use, and benefit, and authority of the state's judicial process
which exists solely to interpret and apply the law by giving effect to an
agreement to ignore the law. 32
Another example of the type of limited judicial review advocated by
Judge Kennard can be found in a recently proposed California statute. 33
This bill would provide for limited substantive appellate review of
arbitration awards, but only if the contract is with a consumer party (i.e., a
party who does not have equal bargaining power) and is a standardized
contract drafted by or on behalf of the nonconsumer party. 34 A "consumer
party" is defined in the bill to include (but not be limited to) employees,
of fact or law which cause substantial injustice and appear on the face of the award. See
id. at 900.
30 Judge Joyce Kennard, Speech to the Section of Litigation of the American Bar
Association (Apr. 19, 1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Speech by Judge
Kennard].
31 Id.
32 Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch. v. Gavin, 331 N.W.2d 418, 430 (Mich. 1982)
(emphasis in original).
33 SB 19, 1997-1998 Regular Session (amended April 17, 1997).
34 See id. § 3(a)(2).
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purchasers of goods or services primarily for personal, family or household
purposes, persons with medical malpractice claims and individuals covered
by health care plans. 35 In such cases, the bill would require the arbitrator to
include written findings of fact and conclusions of law and would give the
consumer party (but not the nonconsumer party) the right to vacate the
award if it "is the result of legal error by the arbitrator that has resulted in
a miscarriage of justice." 36
The scope of judicial review suggested in California Bill No. SB 19
would be limited to correcting legal errors by the arbitrator that have
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, whereas Judge Kennard suggests that
judicial review be limited to arbitral errors which are manifestly erroneous
and cause substantial injustice. 37 However, these vague standards may
encourage all those who believe that they lost in arbitration due to legal
error to claim that the legal error in their case was manifestly erroneous or
resulted in a substantial injustice, whereas the defender of the arbitral
award would undoubtedly argue that even if the arbitrator was wrong on
the law, the error did not rise to the level of a substantial injustice or a
miscarriage of justice.
A similar uncertainty in the standard for the judicial review of arbitral
awards exists in the recently enacted British Arbitration Act of 1996.38
Section 69. of the Act provides that, unless the parties have agreed to
dispense with written reasons for the arbitration tribunal's award, the court
may vacate or modify the award if it finds that "the decision of the tribunal
is obviously wrong" or the legal issue involved is "one of general
importance and the decision of the tribunal is at least open to serious
doubt." 39
Neither Judge Kennard's recommendation for limited judicial review
nor the provisions for limited judicial review contained in California Bill
No. SB 19 and Section 69 of the British Arbitration Act would authorize
35 See id. § 3(b).
36 Section 1286.5(a) of the California Code of Civil Procedure as proposed to be
added by SB 19. It is interesting to note that in the March 31, 1997 draft of SB 19, the
court could vacate the arbitral award only if it is manifestly erroneous and results in
substantial injustice. The April 17, 1997 amendment changed the standard to "legal
error" which results in a "miscarriage of justice." See id. § 3(a)(1).
37 See Speech by Judge Kennard, supra note 30, at 2.
38 Arbitration Act, 1996, ch. 23 (Eng.) (effective January 1, 1997).
39 Arbitration Act, 1996, §§ 69(1), 69(3)(c) (Eng.) (emphasis added.). See Ronald
M. Sturtz, Debate Heats Up Over Judicial Review of Arbitration Results, N.J. L.J.,
Aug. 12, 1996, at S-7 (discussing Section 69).
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the court to apply the same broad standard of review to correct arbitral
errors of law as an appellate court would have to correct errors of law
committed by a trial judge.40 Undoubtedly, the reason these proposals and
provisions limit the scope of judicial review rather than provide for the full
scope of judicial review to correct legal error as applied in the Gateway
Technologies case is that, unlike in Gateway Technologies, such limited
scope of review would be imposed by statute rather than voluntarily agreed
to by the parties. Imposing a right to substantive judicial review by statute
rather than leaving it to the parties to choose it by contract is inconsistent
with the concept of finality, which is one of the important reasons why
some parties agree to arbitration. Another reason that those seeking to
impose substantive judicial review by statute may be reluctant to suggest
full judicial review to correct legal error is the concern that a statutory (as
opposed to a contractual) enlargement of the scope of judicial review might
be too radical a departure from the statutory norm. It also might be deemed
inconsistent with the arbitration policy embodied in the FAA, because full
judicial review to correct all arbitral legal errors might discourage those
who consider finality an essential element of arbitration to refrain from
agreeing to arbitration. However, this concern should be alleviated if the
statute granting the right to substantive judicial review could be negated by
the agreement of the parties, as is the case under the British Arbitration
Act.41 With the possible exception of arbitration agreements imposed on
consumers and others in an adhesion context, substantive judicial review of
arbitral awards should best be left as an option for the parties to consider at
the time they are entering into their arbitration agreement rather than be
imposed by statute.The possibility of a contractual agreement for an appellate arbitration
mechanism to review arbitral awards limited to correcting errors of law
was noted in a recent scholarly article by Professors Stephen Hayford and
Ralph Peeples in which the authors stated:
Undoubtedly, it is the absence of a substantive guarantee of accurate
and correct results that causes many experienced litigators to be reluctant
to embrace commercial arbitration as an acceptable alternative to
traditional litigation. That fact prompts speculation as to the feasibility of
40 See generally SB 19, 1997-1998 Regular Session (amended April 17, 1997); see
also Arbitration Act, 1996, § 69 (Eng.); Speech by Judge Kennard, supra note 30.
41See Arbitration Act, 1996, § 69(1) (Eng.) (permitting the parties to opt out of
substantive judicial review merely by agreeing to waive the statutory provision requiring
the arbitrators to give written reasons for their awards).
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the parties to a given dispute agreeing contractually, at the outset of the
arbitration proceeding, to some form of appellate arbitration mechanism
that would provide a check on the otherwise unreviewable nature of the
commercial arbitration award. As incongruous as such a proposition may
seem to those who praise the relative simplicity and expediency of
arbitration, the Authors maintain it merits consideration. 42
Professors Hayford and Peeples also noted that the scope of review
should be "limited to questions of law and application of law to fact
decided by the original tribunal." 43 Even though Professors Hayford and
Peeples suggest that arbitration awards be reviewed by an arbitral panel
rather than a court, they wisely do not attempt to limit the scope of review
to manifest or substantial legal error. An example of contractual provisions
for substantive review of the arbitral award by an appellate arbitration
panel can be found in paragraph 1 of Appendix B to this Article.
In Tretina Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Associates, Inc.,44 the
Supreme Court of New Jersey articulated the solution for those who have a
problem accepting as final the kind of grossly erroneous arbitral award
rendered by the arbitrators in that case, which has been characterized by at
least one commentator as a "knucklehead" award. 45 After stating that
arbitration awards are intended to be final and not subject to judicial review
absent fraud, corruption or similar wrongdoing on the part of the
arbitrators, the court in Tretina Printing went on to state:
For those who think the parties are entitled to a greater share of justice,
and that such justice exists only in the case of the court, I would hold that
the parties are free to expand the scope of judicial review by providing for
such expansion in their contract; that they may, for example, specifically
provide that the arbitrators shall render their decision only in conformance
with New Jersey law, and that such awards may be reversed either for
mere errors of New Jersey law, substantial errors, or gross errors of New
Jersey law and define therein what they mean by that.46
Paragraph 2 of Appendix A contains an alternative arbitration clause
42 Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An
Assessment and Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 343, 405 (1995).
43 Id.
44 640 A.2d 788, 793 (N.J. 1994) (per curiam).
45 See Sturtz, supra note 39, for a discussion of Tretina Printing and other cases
which involved knucklehead awards which the courts refused to overturn.
46 Tretina Printing, 640 A.2d at 793 (emphasis added).
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which attempts to do what the Tretina Printing court suggested-provide
for judicial review to correct errors of law. However, it avoids attempting
to limit the review to correcting only gross or substantial errors of law
because whether an error of law is a mere error or a substantial or gross
error is often in the eyes of the beholder. In addition, it expressly provides
that the review should be limited to issues of law and that the court shall
accept as final and binding the findings of fact determined by the
arbitrator(s).
By avoiding judicial inquiry into factual issues, such as whether the
arbitrator's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence or
clearly erroneous, it is hoped that the arbitration proceeding will not be
conducted like a judicial trial and that the procedural efficiencies of
arbitration will be preserved. Thus, the need for a .stenographic record of
the arbitral proceedings and the time needed for the court to review the
record will be eliminated. Although giving the arbitrator(s) the power to
make unreviewable findings of fact may create a potential for abuse by an
arbitrator bent on reaching a legally incorrect result, this minimal risk
seems to be more than offset by the advantage of a summary judgment type
of judicial review limited to correcting errors of law. It also has the benefit
of being consistent with the limited provision for judicial review at issue in
the Gateway Technologies case, which is distinguishable from the broader
provision for factual as well as legal review presented in Fils et Cables
D'Acier de Lens and LaPine Technology.
Paragraph 3 of Appendix A contains a provision for the award of costs
and attorney's fees against any party who unsuccessfully seeks to stay the
arbitration, fails to comply with the arbitration award or is unsuccessful in
vacating or modifying the award. This provision covers only the added
costs and expenses of the judicial proceeding caused by the defaulting or
unsuccessful appellant. Its purpose is to make the party losing in arbitration
think twice before forcing the other party to litigate as well as arbitrate.
Accordingly, it does not award costs and attorney's fees against the party
who won in arbitration but subsequently loses in court as a result of the
arbitrator(s) having misapplied the law.
Appendix B to this Article contains various other provisions for arbitral
or judicial review of arbitration awards for those who prefer a greater level
of review and are willing to pay the price of a more expansive review
procedure. Paragraph 1 of Appendix B provides for a right to review by an
appellate arbitration panel rather than a court, which is the type of appellate
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forum suggested by Professors Hayford and Peeples. 47 Paragraph 2 of
Appendix B provides for full judicial review under the substantial evidence
standard for reviewing factual findings (similar to Fils et Cables D'Acier de
Lens and LaPine Technology). Paragraph 3 of Appendix B provides for
judicial review limited to correcting errors of law, which is similar to the
shorter version set forth in paragraph 2 of Appendix A. Paragraph 4 of
Appendix B provides for full judicial review but limits review of the
arbitrator's factual findings to the clearly erroneous standard as though the
arbitrator was acting as a special master under Rule 53(e) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. 48 Finally, paragraph 5 contains a cost-shifting
provision intended to cause the losing party in arbitration to think twice
before seeking judicial review because it requires the appellant to achieve a
result which is at least ten percent better than the arbitral award in order to
avoid paying the appellee's costs and attorney's fees of the appeal.
V. THE LEVEL OF JuDIcIAL REVIEW IN THE ADHESION CONTEXT
The availability of meaningful judicial review is particularly relevant to
the issue of the enforceability of arbitration agreements contained in
contracts of adhesion, especially in the context of nonexecutive or
nonprofessional employees who are required, as a condition of
employment, to agree to a broad arbitration provision which includes
statutory employment discrimination claims. One of the criticisms of the
arbitral process in this context is that arbitrators are not legally required to
follow applicable law and, even if they attempt to do so, their decisions are
not subject to substantive judicial review in the event they apply the law
incorrectly. A recent case in the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals, Cole v. Burns International Security Services49 illustrates the
confusion that exists as to the availability of meaningful judicial review of
arbitral awards in this adhesion context.
The relevant issue in Cole was the enforceability of the pre-dispute
arbitration agreement which plaintiff, a security guard, was required to sign
as a condition of his employment and which clearly included statutory
employment discrimination claims. 50 Plaintiff opposed the employer's
motion to compel arbitration on the ground that "the arbitration agreement
47 See Hayford & Peeples, supra note 42, at 405-406.
48 See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e).
49 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
50 See id. at 1467.
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is unconscionable, because any arbitrator's rulings, even as to the meaning
of public law under Title VII, will not be subject to judicial review. 51 The
circuit court, in affirming the district court, held that the arbitration
agreement was not unconscionable based on the circuit court's assumption
that "meaningful judicial review of public law issues is available" in the
arbitral forum under the "manifest disregard of the law" standard. 52 The
court stated as follows:
The nearly unlimited deference paid to arbitration awards in the context of
collective bargaining is not required, and not appropriate, in the context of
employees' statutory claims. In this context, the Supreme Court has
assumed that arbitration awards are subject to judicial review sufficiently
rigorous to ensure compliance with statutory law. Indeed, Bums has
conceded such review in this case. Because the courts will always remain
available to ensure that arbitrators properly interpret the dictates of public
law, an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims of discrimination is not
unconscionable or otherwise unenforceable. 53
Although recognizing that "manifest disregard of the law" has not been
defined by the Supreme Court and that the circuit courts have adopted
differing interpretations as to the meaning of this judicially created standard
of review, the opinion of Chief Judge Edwards makes the leap of faith that,
in the context of the arbitration of statutory claims, "judicial review under
the 'manifest disregard of the law' standard is sufficiently rigorous to
ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied statutory
law." 54 Unfortunately, this conclusion by Chief Judge Edwards reflects
what he (and many others, including this author) thinks the law should be
in the context of mandatory arbitration of statutory employment
discrimination claims rather than what the law actually is in that context.
The pre-dispute agreement signed by the employee in Cole made it
clear that the agreement covered claims involving statutory
antidiscrimination laws and that, by agreeing to have any future disputes
resolved by arbitration, the employee would forfeit the right to a trial by
jury. 55 The arbitration agreement also provided (in large type) that the
employee "may wish to consult an attorney prior to signing this
51 Id. at 1486.
52 Id. at 1486-1487.
53 Id. at 1468-1469.
54 Id. at 1487.
55 See id. at 1469.
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agreement." 56 Thus, Chief Judge Edwards did not find any other basis for
believing that the pre-dispute arbitration agreement in this case was
unconscionable, and he assumed that there would be meaningful judicial
review to correct any errors of law which the arbitrators might make.57
However, it is not clear that such an assumption is warranted.
Even in the context of employment discrimination claims, most federal
courts have held that the fact that an arbitrator has misinterpreted or
misapplied the law is not grounds for vacating an arbitral award, either
under the manifest disregard standard or any of the other judicially created
standards for overturning arbitral awards. 58 For example, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals recently held in DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc.59 that an arbitration award in favor of an employee asserting an age
discrimination claim should not be vacated or modified even though the
award failed to include the statutorily required attorney's fees. The court
based its decision on the fact that there was no proof that the arbitrators
actually knew of and intentionally disregarded the employee's statutory
right to attorney's fees. 60 Although the employee argued that the Second
Circuit should adopt a more stringent standard of judicial review than the
manifest disregard standard when statutory employment rights are involved,
the court refused to do so, noting that the employee failed to make that
56 Id.
57 See id. at 1487. However, Chief Judge Edwards did find that the provision in the
AAA arbitration rules incorporated into the arbitration agreement, which requires that
the arbitrator's fees be shared equally by the parties unless the arbitrator specifies
otherwise, would render the arbitration agreement unenforceable in this adhesion
context. Thus, the court conditioned its order enforcing the employees agreement to
arbitrate at the election of the employer on the employer's agreement to pay the
arbitrator's fees, irrespective of the outcome of the case. Judge Karen Henderson
dissented on this point, stating that the court had no authority to reform the arbitration
agreement and that the court should either enforce the agreement as written or declare it
unenforceable. See id. at 1488-1491. It is interesting to note that the court did not
discuss the issue of whether the unilateral nature of the arbitration provision (i.e., that
the employee was bound to arbitration whereas the employer could choose between
arbitration or litigation) would render the arbitration agreement unconscionable and thus
unenforceable in this adhesion context.
58 See generally Michael P. O'Mullan, Seeking Consistency in Judicial Review of
Securities Arbitration: An Analysis of the Manifest Disregard of the Law Standard, 64
FoRDiAM L. REv. 1121 (1995).
59 No. 96-9068, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 20505 (2d Cir. Aug. 5, 1997).
60 See id. at *10.
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argument to the district court. 61 However, in Chisolm v. Kidder, Peabody
Asset Management, Inc.,62 the court in a similar age discrimination case
expressly declined "to create a second standard for manifest disregard
when statutory claims are made" even though the employee argued to the
district court that it should do S0. 63
Judge Constance Baker Motley's opinion in Chisolm referred to Chief
Judge Edwards' "thoughtful opinion in the Cole case advocating that the
term manifest disregard be interpreted to involve more substantial judicial
oversight in claims raised under the ADEA."64 Judge Motley, in refusing
to follow Chief Judge Edwards' suggestion, noted that a more stringent
standard of judicial review for statutory claims might discourage those
parties who considered finality an important aspect of arbitration from
entering into arbitration agreements. However, even in the context of
mandatory arbitration of employment discrimination claims, she was unable
to conclude that it would be permissible to apply a heightened standard of
judicial review "in light of the fact that there is nothing in the case law
which could possibly support such a conclusion. "65
Employers who seek to require their employees to agree to arbitration
as a condition of employment may be well advised to include in their
arbitration agreement a provision for judicial review to correct errors of
law committed by the arbitrators, at least in the context of statutory claims.
By so doing, they would eliminate one of the major criticisms of mandatory
arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims in this context.
VI. CONCLUSION
The beauty of arbitration is that it is a creature of contract. The parties
can choose between arbitration that offers arbitral finality with no review
(except to the limited extent provided by statute), or they can choose the
other extreme, which is full judicial review as though the arbitral panel
were a trial court. Instead of choosing one extreme or the other, a sensible
middle ground might be to choose judicial review limited to correcting
errors of law. This middle ground, which is illustrated in paragraph 2 of
Appendix A and paragraph 3 of Appendix B, provides a mechanism to
61 See id. at *8-.*9.
62 966 F. Supp. 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
63 1d. at 226.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 227.
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correct an arbitrator's legal error without burdening the parties with the
costs and delay of a review process that might require a full review of a
stenographic record of the arbitral proceeding. Whether the factual findings
of the arbitrator are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard, the
clearly erroneous standard or the arbitrary and capricious standard, the
burdens of such a factual review may well outweigh its benefits. The broad
scope of legal review suggested in these Appendices also avoids the
uncertainty inherent in limiting the scope of the review to legal errors that
are gross or substantial or which would result in a miscarriage of justice.
Limiting judicial review of the arbitrator's conclusions of law by such a
vague standard would create an additional level of uncertainty and would
require a more subjective determination than is required where the usual
judicial standard of legal error is applied. Moreover, if the goal of the
parties is to obtain the same result that they would hope to obtain in court,
it is not likely they would want to accept a legally incorrect award merely
because the legal error is not gross or substantial.
With the possible exception of arbitration agreements that are imposed
on the weaker party in the context of a contract of adhesion, parties to an
arbitration agreement should not be required to subject arbitral awards to
substantive judicial review unless they have expressly agreed to do so.
Thus, arbitral finality should continue to be the default provision in the
general arbitration statutes and standard rules governing commercial
arbitration. However, if the parties elect to include provisions for judicial
review to correct errors of law, it might be desirable for such provisions to
be written into the statute or rules so that the specific terms governing the
scope of such review can merely be incorporated by reference into the
arbitration clause. As a practical matter, the lawyers drafting commercial
agreements are usually unwilling to spend the time to negotiate the terms of
an arbitration clause and the wording of provisions for judicial review
because they often consider the possibility of future litigation too remote to
worry about. The ability to obtain the safety net of judicial review to
correct legal error merely by incorporating a standard judicial review
provision by reference in the arbitration clause may avoid the need for the
parties to negotiate the specific language of the judicial review provisions
and thus encourage a greater use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements by
those who would not agree to arbitration without this safety net.
The time to focus on the issue of judicial review of arbitral awards is at
the contract drafting stage, before any dispute arises. The option of
substantive judicial review, and the extent and scope of such review, should
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be considered by those who draft arbitration agreements, especially where
the parties do not have equal bargaining power, as is the case where the
arbitration agreement is required as a condition of employment.
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APPENDIX A
ALTERNATIVE ARBITRATION CLAUSE WITH LIMITED
JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. Alternative to AAA Standard Arbitration Clause
Any controversy, claim or dispute of whatever nature [arising between
the parties, including, but not limited to, those] arising out of or relating to
this Agreement or the construction, interpretation, performance, breach,
termination, enforceability or validity of hereof, whether such claim existed
prior to or arises on or after the date of this Agreement, including the
determination of the scope of this agreement to arbitrate, shall be
determined by arbitration in __ [city] by [one] [a panel of three]
arbitrator[s] in accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) and its Supplementary Procedures
for Large, Complex Disputes, except that (a) every person named on all
lists of potential arbitrators shall be a neutral and impartial lawyer with
excellent academic and professional credentials (i) who has practiced law
for at least [fifteen] years, specializing in either general commercial
litigation or general corporate and commercial matters, [with experience in
the field of ] and (ii) who has had experience and is
generally available to serve as an arbitrator and (b) each party shall be
entitled to strike on a peremptory basis, for any reason or no reason, any or
all of the names of potential arbitrators on any list submitted to the parties
by the AAA, as well as any person selected by the AAA to serve as an
arbitrator by administrative appointment. In the event the parties cannot
agree on the selection of the arbitrator(s) from the one or more lists
submitted by the AAA within thirty days after the AAA transmits to the
parties its first list of potential arbitrators, the President of [the
_ Bar Association] shall nominate three persons for each
vacancy in the arbitration panel who, in his or her opinion, meet the
criteria set forth herein, which nominees may not include persons named on
any list submitted by the AAA. Each party shall be entitled to strike one of
such three nominees for each vacancy on a peremptory basis within ten
days after its receipt of such list of nominees, indicating its order of
preference with respect to the remaining nominees. The selection of the
arbitrator shall be made by the AAA from the remaining nominees in
accordance with the parties' mutual order of preference or by random
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selection in the absence of a mutual order of preference. The arbitrator(s)
shall endeavor to base their award on applicable law and judicial precedent,
shall include in such award the findings of fact and conclusions of law upon
which the award is based and shall not grant any remedy or relief that a
court could not grant under applicable law. The award shall be final and
binding on all parties and shall not be vacated or modified (for errors of
law or otherwise) except upon the grounds expressly provided in the
Federal Arbitration Act. Judgment on the award rendered by the
arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
2. Provision for Limited Judicial Review of the Arbitration Award
Notwithstanding the foregoing, [in the event that the dispute submitted
to arbitration is determined by one arbitrator, or by the unanimous decision
of three arbitrators,] upon the application by either party to a court for an
order confirming, modifying or vacating the award, the court shall have the
power to review whether, as a matter of law based on the findings of fact
determined by the arbitrator(s), the award should be confirmed, modified
or vacated in order to correct any errors of law made by the arbitrator(s).
In order to effectuate such judicial review limited to issues of law, the
parties agree (and shall so stipulate to the court) that the findings of fact
made by the arbitrator(s) shall be final and binding on the parties and shall
serve as the facts to be submitted to and relied on by the court in
determining the extent to which the award should be confirmed, modified
or vacated.
3. Provision for Award of Costs and Attorney's Fees Against Party
Breaching Arbitration Provisions
If either party fails to proceed with arbitration as provided herein,
unsuccessfully seeks to stay such arbitration, fails to comply with any
arbitration award or is unsuccessful in vacating or modifying the award
pursuant to a petition or application for judicial review, such defaulting or
unsuccessful party shall pay to the other party an amount equal to all costs,
including reasonable attorney fees, paid or incurred by such other party in
successfully compelling such arbitration or defending against the attempt to
stay, vacate or modify such arbitration award and/or successfully defending
or enforcing the award.
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APPENDIX B
OTHER PROVISIONS PERMITTING APPELLATE REVIEW
OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
1. Right to Review by Appellate Arbitration Panel
(a) If either party is dissatisfied with (i) the decision or award rendered
by a sole arbitrator or (ii) a less than unanimous decision or award
rendered by a panel of three arbitrators, such dissatisfied party
("Appellant") may appeal the arbitrator's award to a panel of three
appellate arbitrators by filing with the American Arbitration Association
(AAA) and the other party ("Appellee"), within twenty days after
transmittal of the award, a written brief, not to exceed twenty pages, stating
the reasons why the arbitrator's decision should be reversed or modified.
The Appellee shall file with the AAA and serve on the Appellant, within
twenty days after receiving the Appellant's brief, an opposition brief, not to
exceed twenty pages, which may include a cross-appeal, in which case
Appellant shall be entitled to reply within ten days after its receipt thereof.
(b) The appellate arbitration panel shall consist of two lawyers having
the qualifications and experience set forth in [Section -] hereof and one
retired federal or state court judge of a court of record in the state in which
the arbitration was held. The two lawyers shall be appointed in the same
manner as provided in [Section -] hereof. If the parties cannot agree on a
mutually acceptable retired judge to serve as the third appellate arbitrator,
the President of [the Bar Association] shall submit to both
parties a list containing the names of three retired judges who, in his or her
opinion, also meet the criteria set forth in [Section -] hereof. Each party
shall be entitled to strike one of such three names on a peremptory basis,
for any reason or no reason, indicating its order of preference with respect
to the remaining names, and the selection of the third appellate arbitrator
shall be made from among such name(s) that have not been so stricken by
either party in accordance with their designated order of mutual preference.
(c) Either party may request oral argument before the appellate panel,
which, if requested, should be conducted within thirty days following the
selection of the appellate panel. The appellate arbitration shall be based
only on the record of the initial hearing, appellate briefs and oral argument,
if any. The appellate arbitrators shall render a written decision, signed by a
majority of such arbitrators, affirming, reversing, modifying or remanding
the arbitrator's decision and award within thirty days after receiving the
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final appellate submissions. The appellate arbitrators may reverse or
modify the arbitrator's decision and award or remand the matter for further
proceedings by the arbitrator, on any of the following grounds:
(i) Any ground specified in Sections 10 and 11 of the Federal
Arbitration Act;
(ii) The arbitrator committed prejudicial error by erroneously
applying the law to the issues and facts presented for resolution of the
dispute or there was a miscalculation of figures or a mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(iii) Material failure of the arbitrator, the administrator or the
Appellee to follow the procedures set forth in this Agreement unless the
Appellant continued the arbitration proceeding with notice of such failure
and without objection; or
(iv) The arbitrator's award is arbitrary, capricious or clearly
erroneous.
(d) The appellate panel may render a final decision on appeal or
remand the matter for further proceedings by the arbitrator. The decision of
the appellate panel shall be final and binding on the parties and shall not be
subject to judicial review except to the extent otherwise provided in
Sections 10 or 11 of the FAA.
(e) [See paragraph 5 below imposing costs and attorney's fees on an
unsuccessful Appellant.]
2. Right to Full Judicial Review
The arbitrator(s) shall set forth in writing their findings of fact and
conclusions of law and shall render their award based thereon. Upon
application by either party to a court for an order confirming, modifying or
vacating the award, the court shall have the power to review (a) whether
the findings of fact rendered by the arbitrator(s) are supported by
substantial evidence and (b) whether, as a matter of law based on such
findings of fact, the award should be confirmed, modified or vacated. Upon
such determination, judgment shall be entered in favor of either party
consistent herewith.
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3. Right to Limited Judicial Review Under State Law Based on Facts
Found by the Arbitrator
(a) The arbitrator(s) shall set forth in writing their findings of fact and
conclusions of law and shall render their award based thereon. No party
shall seek a confirmation of the arbitral award until at least thirty days have
elapsed from the delivery of said award to the party or parties seeking
confirmation. Any petition or other request for confirmation prior to such
date, or during the pendency of an action on submitted facts pursuant to the
statute referred to in paragraph (b) hereof, shall be stayed and this
paragraph shall be deemed as consent to such stay by all parties to this
Agreement.
(b) Either party may seek judicial review of the arbitrator(s)' award by
commencing an action on submitted facts under [Section __] of the statutes
of the [State of I within twenty days after its receipt of
the arbitral award. The findings of fact rendered by the arbitrator(s) shall
serve as the submission of facts required pursuant to such section. Upon the
court's determination of such action and its rendering a judgment or order
thereon, the decision and award of the arbitrator(s) shall be rendered null
and void and of no further force or effect, and such judgment of the court
shall be reviewable in the same manner as any other order, decision or
judgment of a judge of the [_Court] of the [State of
4. Right to More Complete Judicial Review Under Federal Rules as
Though the Arbitrator Acted as a Special Master
(a) A party who desires to appeal the arbitrator(s)' award (Appellant)
shall give notice of its intent to appeal to the other party (Appellee) no later
than twenty days after the arbitrator's award is rendered. The appellee may
in turn give notice to the Appellant of the Appellee's desired venue for the
appeal no later than ten days after receipt of the Appellant's notice of intent
to appeal.
(b) An Appellant who has complied with the notice provisions above
may appeal the award by filing an action for affirmative or declaratory
relief concerning the subject matter of the arbitration, but for no other
relief, in a court having general trial jurisdiction that includes the matter in
controversy. If such a court exists within a venue specified by the appellee
pursuant to the previous paragraph, the action shall be filed in that venue.
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Such an action shall be filed no later than forty-five days after the
arbitrator's award is rendered.
(c) The Appellee may counterclaim for enforcement of the award.
Alternatively, the Appellee may cross-appeal by counterclaiming for
affirmative or declaratory relief concerning the subject matter of the
arbitration, but for no other relief.
(d) An award from which an appeal permitted by this Agreement is
timely taken shall not be a binding award, but nevertheless shall be filed
with the court as follows:
(i) The parties agree that the arbitrator shall set forth in writing the
findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the award is based and
that such findings and conclusions shall be filed with the court as the report
of a special master in the manner and with the effect prescribed by Rule
53(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The findings of fact shall not
be final but shall be subject to review under the "clearly erroneous"
standard as prescribed by Rule 53(e)(2) and (4) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(ii) The parties agree that the record in the arbitration hearing shall
automatically become the agreed record in the action, subject to re-opening
before the same arbitration panel only in accordance with the principles
governing new trials to the court under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(iii) If the action is filed in a state court or other forum other than a
United States district court, the parties agree that the stipulations in this
subsection shall nevertheless apply in the same manner as if the action had
been filed in a United States district court.
(e) The running of any statute of limitations applicable to a claim or
counterclaim made in the arbitration proceeding shall be tolled during the
arbitration proceeding to the extent that the claim or counterclaim was not
barred by time limitations when made.
(f) If an award is appealable under this Section and an appeal is not
timely made in accordance with the procedures of this Section, then the
award shall automatically become final and binding as between the parties
and nonappealable for any reason. The award may thereafter be confirmed
or enforced by either party in any court of competent jurisdiction by the
filing of an appropriate action. Each party shall be deemed to have
conclusively waived any and all defenses against enforcement that could
have been made in an appeal pursuant to this Section, including any and all
defenses that would otherwise be available under the FAA.
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5. Optional Provision Regarding Shifting Costs of Appeal
If the Appellant is unsuccessful in vacating or modifying the
arbitrator's award pursuant to the foregoing appellate procedure, or if
Appellant succeeds in modifying the award with respect to the amount of
money payable to or by Appellant but such modification does not increase
the amount payable to, or decrease the amount payable by, Appellant by at
least ten percent of the amount awarded by the arbitrator, then Appellant
shall bear one-hundred percent of the costs of the appeal and shall
reimburse the Appellee for its reasonable attorney's fees, costs and
disbursements incurred by Appellee in defending the appeal. The Appellee
shall not be required to reimburse Appellant for any of its costs, expenses
or attorney's fees (even if Appellant is successful in such appeal) except to
the extent otherwise provided by applicable law or the provisions of this
Agreement.
